{
  "theory": "PP",
  "name": "Predictive Processing",
  "layout": "cognitive",
  "references": [
    {"n": 1, "cite": "Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11, 127-138.", "doi": "10.1038/nrn2787", "verified": "crossref"},
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    {"n": 3, "cite": "Clark, A. (2016). Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford University Press.", "doi": "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 4, "cite": "Hohwy, J. (2013). The Predictive Mind. Oxford University Press.", "doi": "10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 5, "cite": "Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(11), 565-573.", "doi": "10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 6, "cite": "Seth, A. K. (2021). Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. Faber & Faber.", "doi": null, "verified": "ISBN 9780571337705 (Open Library edition record: Faber & Faber, 2021, 320 pp.)"},
    {"n": 7, "cite": "Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 23, 439-452.", "doi": "10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4", "verified": "crossref; accepted manuscript read (figshare 23488103)"},
    {"n": 8, "cite": "Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. K. (2020). Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II), 3.", "doi": "10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.64", "verified": "crossref; full text read (publisher PDF)"},
    {"n": 9, "cite": "Carhart-Harris, R. L., & Friston, K. J. (2019). REBUS and the anarchic brain: Toward a unified model of the brain action of psychedelics. Pharmacological Reviews, 71(3), 316-344.", "doi": "10.1124/pr.118.017160", "verified": "crossref; full text read (Europe PMC PMC6588209)"},
    {"n": 10, "cite": "Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., & Friston, K. (2008). Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: An epistemological review. Cognition, 108(3), 687-701.", "doi": "10.1016/j.cognition.2008.05.010", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 11, "cite": "Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, 215.", "doi": "10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 12, "cite": "Kok, P., Jehee, J. F. M., & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Less is more: Expectation sharpens representations in the primary visual cortex. Neuron, 75(2), 265-270.", "doi": "10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.034", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 13, "cite": "Pinto, Y., van Gaal, S., de Lange, F. P., Lamme, V. A. F., & Seth, A. K. (2015). Expectations accelerate entry of visual stimuli into awareness. Journal of Vision, 15(8), 13.", "doi": "10.1167/15.8.13", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 14, "cite": "Melloni, L., Schwiedrzik, C. M., Müller, N., Rodriguez, E., & Singer, W. (2011). Expectations change the signatures and timing of electrophysiological correlates of perceptual awareness. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(4), 1386-1396.", "doi": "10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4570-10.2011", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 15, "cite": "Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R. (2019). Hallucinations and strong priors. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(2), 114-127.", "doi": "10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 16, "cite": "Powers, A. R., Mathys, C., & Corlett, P. R. (2017). Pavlovian conditioning-induced hallucinations result from overweighting of perceptual priors. Science, 357(6351), 596-600.", "doi": "10.1126/science.aan3458", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 17, "cite": "Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: A Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10, 48-58.", "doi": "10.1038/nrn2536", "verified": "crossref (online 2008, issue 2009)"},
    {"n": 18, "cite": "Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012). Canonical microcircuits for predictive coding. Neuron, 76(4), 695-711.", "doi": "10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 19, "cite": "Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 360(1456), 815-836.", "doi": "10.1098/rstb.2005.1622", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 20, "cite": "Garrido, M. I., Kilner, J. M., Stephan, K. E., & Friston, K. J. (2009). The mismatch negativity: A review of underlying mechanisms. Clinical Neurophysiology, 120(3), 453-463.", "doi": "10.1016/j.clinph.2008.11.029", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 21, "cite": "SanMiguel, I., Widmann, A., Bendixen, A., Trujillo-Barreto, N., & Schröger, E. (2013). Hearing silences: Human auditory processing relies on preactivation of sound-specific brain activity patterns. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(20), 8633-8639.", "doi": "10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5821-12.2013", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 22, "cite": "Seth, A. K., & Tsakiris, M. (2018). Being a beast machine: The somatic basis of selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(11), 969-981.", "doi": "10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 23, "cite": "Seth, A. K. (2014). A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia. Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(2), 97-118.", "doi": "10.1080/17588928.2013.877880", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 24, "cite": "Friston, K. (2018). Am I self-conscious? (Or does self-organization entail self-consciousness?). Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 579.", "doi": "10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 25, "cite": "Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017). Active inference: A process theory. Neural Computation, 29(1), 1-49.", "doi": "10.1162/NECO_a_00912", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 26, "cite": "Hohwy, J. (2012). Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 96.", "doi": "10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 27, "cite": "Summerfield, C., Trittschuh, E. H., Monti, J. M., Mesulam, M.-M., & Egner, T. (2008). Neural repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations. Nature Neuroscience, 11, 1004-1006.", "doi": "10.1038/nn.2163", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 28, "cite": "de Lange, F. P., Heilbron, M., & Kok, P. (2018). How do expectations shape perception? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 22(9), 764-779.", "doi": "10.1016/j.tics.2018.06.002", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 29, "cite": "Corcoran, A. W., Haun, A. M., Dorman, R., Tononi, G., Friston, K. J., Pennartz, C. M. A., & TWCF: INTREPID Consortium (2026). Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 187, 106742.", "doi": "10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.106742", "verified": "crossref; full text read (arXiv 2509.00555 v3)"},
    {"n": 30, "cite": "Whyte, C. J., Corcoran, A. W., Robinson, J., Smith, R., Moran, R. J., Parr, T., Friston, K. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2026). On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference. Physics of Life Reviews, 56, 4-28.", "doi": "10.1016/j.plrev.2025.11.002", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex); claims as summarised in ref. 29"},
    {"n": 31, "cite": "Robinson, J. E., Corcoran, A. W., Whyte, C. J., Sárközy, A., Seth, A. K., Kovács, G., Friston, K. J., Pennartz, C. M. A., Tononi, G., Hohwy, J., & TWCF: INTREPID Consortium (2025). The role of active inference in conscious awareness. PLOS One, 20(12), e0328836.", "doi": "10.1371/journal.pone.0328836", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 32, "cite": "Marchi, F., & Hohwy, J. (2022). The intermediate scope of consciousness in the predictive mind. Erkenntnis, 87(2), 891-912.", "doi": "10.1007/s10670-020-00222-7", "verified": "crossref (online 2020, issue 2022); claim as summarised in ref. 29"},
    {"n": 33, "cite": "Weilnhammer, V., Stuke, H., Hesselmann, G., Sterzer, P., & Schmack, K. (2017). A predictive coding account of bistable perception - a model-based fMRI study. PLOS Computational Biology, 13(5), e1005536.", "doi": "10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005536", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 34, "cite": "Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., & Friston, K. J. (2013). The computational anatomy of psychosis. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4, 47.", "doi": "10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 35, "cite": "Sterzer, P., Adams, R. A., Fletcher, P., Frith, C., Lawrie, S. M., Muckli, L., Petrovic, P., Uhlhaas, P., Voss, M., & Corlett, P. R. (2018). The predictive coding account of psychosis. Biological Psychiatry, 84(9), 634-643.", "doi": "10.1016/j.biopsych.2018.05.015", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 36, "cite": "Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016). Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 371(1708), 20160007.", "doi": "10.1098/rstb.2016.0007", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 37, "cite": "Seth, A. K. (2025). Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49.", "doi": "10.1017/S0140525X25000032", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 38, "cite": "Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: A functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(1), 79-87.", "doi": "10.1038/4580", "verified": "crossref"},
    {"n": 39, "cite": "Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013). Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions. Cognitive Processing, 14(4), 411-427.", "doi": "10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 40, "cite": "Kok, P., Failing, M. F., & de Lange, F. P. (2014). Prior expectations evoke stimulus templates in the primary visual cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26(7), 1546-1554.", "doi": "10.1162/jocn_a_00562", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 41, "cite": "Kok, P., Rahnev, D., Jehee, J. F. M., Lau, H. C., & de Lange, F. P. (2012). Attention reverses the effect of prediction in silencing sensory signals. Cerebral Cortex, 22(9), 2197-2206.", "doi": "10.1093/cercor/bhr310", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 42, "cite": "Suzuki, K., Garfinkel, S. N., Critchley, H. D., & Seth, A. K. (2013). Multisensory integration across exteroceptive and interoceptive domains modulates self-experience in the rubber-hand illusion. Neuropsychologia, 51(13), 2909-2917.", "doi": "10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.08.014", "verified": "crossref; abstract read (OpenAlex)"},
    {"n": 43, "cite": "Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(7), 419-429.", "doi": "10.1038/nrn3950", "verified": "crossref"}
  ],
  "nodes": [
    {"id": "A1", "level": "core", "text": "The brain is a hierarchical generative model that continually predicts its sensory input and minimises prediction error, either by revising its predictions (perception) or by acting to bring the input in line with them (active inference)", "classes": ["cognitive", "brain-specific"], "refs": [1, 2, 4, 3]},
    {"id": "A2", "level": "core", "text": "The contents of conscious perception are the brain's best guess about the causes of its sensory signals, i.e. the content of the top-down predictions of the hypothesis that best explains away prediction error: perception is a controlled hallucination", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [6, 4, 7, 3]},
    {"id": "A3", "level": "core", "text": "Conscious selfhood and emotion are grounded in control-oriented predictive regulation of the body's physiological condition (allostasis): we experience ourselves because, not in spite, of being 'beast machines'", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [22, 6, 5]},

    {"id": "B1", "level": "L1", "text": "Predictions flow down the hierarchy and only prediction errors (the input left unexplained) flow up; the posterior at one level acts as the prior for the level below", "classes": ["substrate-general"], "refs": [19, 38, 2, 8]},
    {"id": "B2", "level": "L1", "text": "Prediction errors are weighted by their expected precision (inverse variance), which determines how strongly they update beliefs", "classes": ["substrate-general", "cognitive"], "refs": [11, 4, 9]},
    {"id": "B3", "level": "L1", "text": "Attention is the optimisation of precision expectations during perceptual inference, akin to adjusting the gain of sensory signals", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [11, 26, 7]},
    {"id": "B4", "level": "L1", "text": "A mental state is conscious if it is part of the current best guess (the posterior with the most evidence); content that is not part of the winning hypothesis is not consciously perceived", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [10, 7, 8]},
    {"id": "B5", "level": "L1", "text": "Action is inference: policies are inferred from the prediction error they are expected to yield, and movement fulfils proprioceptive predictions, so goals act as priors about the organism's future states", "classes": ["cognitive", "substrate-general"], "refs": [25, 8, 39]},
    {"id": "B6", "level": "L1", "text": "Self-organising systems that persist must minimise variational free energy, a bound on surprise; prediction-error minimisation is how brains do this", "classes": ["substrate-general"], "refs": [1, 24]},
    {"id": "B7", "level": "L1", "text": "Emotions and feeling states arise from actively inferred predictive models of the causes of interoceptive signals (interoceptive inference)", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [5, 36, 7]},
    {"id": "B8", "level": "L1", "text": "The experience of being a self (being a body, having a perspective, acting) is itself a form of perceptual prediction, a best guess about the organism that does the perceiving", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [6, 5, 22]},
    {"id": "B9", "level": "L1", "text": "Consciousness science should explain, predict and control the phenomenological properties of experience by mapping them onto properties of predictive mechanisms (the 'real problem'), rather than first explaining why experience exists", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [7, 6, 8]},

    {"id": "C1", "level": "L2", "text": "Only a privileged subset of posterior beliefs, those at intermediate spatiotemporal scales relevant to guiding embodied action, contributes to conscious experience", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [32, 29]},
    {"id": "C2", "level": "L2", "text": "Active inference is necessary but not sufficient for a change in conscious content: every change in content is driven by a change in inferred states that comes about through action, overt (e.g., a saccade) or covert (e.g., a shift of attention)", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [30, 29, 7]},
    {"id": "C3", "level": "L2", "text": "Consciousness requires that the generative model has temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, supporting inference about the consequences of what the agent could do", "classes": ["cognitive", "substrate-general"], "refs": [24, 29, 8]},
    {"id": "C4", "level": "L2", "text": "Perceptual presence (objects seeming really there) depends on the counterfactual richness of the generative model: how sensory input would change under a repertoire of possible actions", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [23, 8, 7]},
    {"id": "C5", "level": "L2", "text": "Hallucinations arise when overly precise (strong) priors outweigh sensory evidence: hallucination is uncontrolled perception", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [15, 16, 6]},
    {"id": "C6", "level": "L2", "text": "Psychotic symptoms (hallucinations, delusions, sensory-attenuation deficits) are expressions of one core pathology: aberrant encoding of precision", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [34, 17, 35]},
    {"id": "C7", "level": "L2", "text": "Psychedelics relax the precision of high-level priors, liberating bottom-up information flow so that prediction errors find freer register in conscious experience (REBUS)", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [9]},
    {"id": "C8", "level": "L2", "text": "In binocular rivalry the dominant hypothesis leaves part of the input unexplained; the resulting prediction error accumulates until the rival hypothesis wins, and the cycle repeats", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [10, 7, 4]},
    {"id": "C9", "level": "L2", "text": "Expectations shape both the content of and the speed of access to conscious perception: conscious access depends on the verification of perceptual predictions", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [13, 7, 28]},
    {"id": "C10", "level": "L2", "text": "Body ownership depends on online predictive integration of exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive signals", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [42, 5]},

    {"id": "D1", "level": "L3", "text": "Validly expected stimuli enter awareness faster than neutral or unexpected ones (e.g., under continuous flash suppression), with a larger effect when bottom-up input is ambiguous", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [13, 8]},
    {"id": "D2", "level": "L3", "text": "Hallucinations can be induced in healthy people by conditioning a percept to a cue, and people who hear voices are more susceptible to these conditioned hallucinations", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [16, 15]},
    {"id": "D3", "level": "L3", "text": "Judgements of spatial extent across the blind spot or a cortical scotoma should be less accurate, but not systematically contracted or dilated apart from regression to prior expectations, because the gap is filled in by prediction", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [29]},
    {"id": "D4", "level": "L3", "text": "A target that has vanished in motion-induced blindness should reappear sooner when the observer actively saccades to it than in a passive replay with matched visual input", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [29, 31]},
    {"id": "D5", "level": "L3", "text": "Self-produced sensations are attenuated, so self-generated forces are matched with stronger forces (force-matching illusion); removing this attenuation abolishes the illusion and yields false inferences about agency", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [39, 8]},
    {"id": "D6", "level": "L3", "text": "Synaesthetic concurrents are experienced without perceptual presence, because they lack counterfactually rich sensorimotor predictions", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [23]},
    {"id": "D7", "level": "L3", "text": "Psychedelics should alter perception first (most tangibly in vision) at low doses and disrupt high-level beliefs, including the sense of self, at higher doses", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [9]},
    {"id": "D8", "level": "L3", "text": "Cardio-visual feedback synchronous with the heartbeat should increase ownership of a virtual hand compared with asynchronous feedback, scaled by individual interoceptive sensitivity", "classes": ["cognitive"], "refs": [42]},
    {"id": "D9", "level": "L3", "text": "Free-energy minimisation also applies to non-conscious systems (e.g., viruses); conscious creatures, such as primates and probably all mammals, are distinguished by how they minimise prediction error, e.g. with temporally deep, counterfactual generative models", "classes": ["extrapolation", "substrate-general"], "refs": [8, 24]},
    {"id": "D10", "level": "L3", "text": "Consciousness depends on our nature as living organisms; computation alone is unlikely to suffice, so conscious AI is unlikely on current trajectories but becomes more plausible as AI becomes more brain-like and/or life-like", "classes": ["extrapolation"], "refs": [37, 6]},

    {"id": "E1", "level": "L4", "text": "In the canonical cortical microcircuit, superficial pyramidal cells send prediction errors forward and deep pyramidal cells send predictions backward", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [18, 7]},
    {"id": "E2", "level": "L4", "text": "Precision is encoded by the postsynaptic gain of prediction-error units, set by neuromodulation (e.g., dopamine) and NMDA-receptor function; abnormalities of this gain control underlie psychosis", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [34, 11, 35]},
    {"id": "E3", "level": "L4", "text": "Interoceptive predictions are issued by agranular visceromotor cortices (e.g., anterior insula, cingulate) and compared with interoceptive input in the insula", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [43, 5]},
    {"id": "E4", "level": "L4", "text": "Psychedelics relax high-level priors by stimulating 5-HT2A receptors on deep-layer pyramidal cells, which are thought to encode priors", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [9]},

    {"id": "F1", "level": "L5", "text": "Expected stimuli evoke weaker sensory responses than unexpected ones (expectation suppression), and repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [27, 28]},
    {"id": "F2", "level": "L5", "text": "Despite their reduced response amplitude, expected stimuli are represented more sharply in primary visual cortex (higher decoding accuracy)", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [12]},
    {"id": "F3", "level": "L5", "text": "Attention reverses expectation suppression: when attended, predicted stimuli evoke larger rather than smaller responses in visual cortex", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [41, 8]},
    {"id": "F4", "level": "L5", "text": "Deviant stimuli evoke a mismatch negativity that reflects prediction error and changes in forward and backward connectivity", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [20]},
    {"id": "F5", "level": "L5", "text": "Omission of an expected stimulus evokes a stimulus-specific response in sensory cortex resembling that to the stimulus itself (a template of the prediction)", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [40, 21]},
    {"id": "F6", "level": "L5", "text": "Expectations lower the threshold of conscious perception and make neural signatures that distinguish seen from unseen stimuli appear earlier (about 200 rather than 300 ms)", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [14, 8]},
    {"id": "F7", "level": "L5", "text": "Model-derived prediction-error signals in inferior frontal gyri and anterior insulae should track endogenous perceptual transitions in bistable perception", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [33, 8]},
    {"id": "F8", "level": "L5", "text": "Psychedelics should increase the entropy of spontaneous cortical activity and bottom-up effective connectivity while reducing the functional integrity of high-level networks such as the default-mode network", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [9]},
    {"id": "F9", "level": "L5", "text": "Changes in top-down predictive signalling should change conscious states; finding top-down signalling without consciousness, or changes in it that leave conscious states unaffected, would challenge the theory", "classes": ["brain-specific"], "refs": [7, 8]}
  ],
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    {"from": "E2", "to": "F3"},
    {"from": "B3", "to": "F3"},
    {"from": "E1", "to": "F4"},
    {"from": "E1", "to": "F5"},
    {"from": "D1", "to": "F6"},
    {"from": "C8", "to": "F7"},
    {"from": "E4", "to": "F8"},
    {"from": "A2", "to": "F9"},
    {"from": "E1", "to": "F9"}
  ]
}