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FMT Prediction Map

The Four-Model Theory of consciousness as a network of claims and predictions, compared with five other theories. Map v1, built from FMT v19, 2026-10.

This map sets out the Four-Model Theory of consciousness (FMT) as a network of claims. Each box is one claim. Each arrow says that the claim it points to holds in virtue of the claim it starts from. The three principles of the theory form the core, in the left column. Every column to the right specifies the one before it, and the last two columns hold the theory's empirical predictions: neuroscientific ones at level 4, cognitive and behavioural ones at level 5. Select a box or an arrow to read it.

The page also carries the maps that Negro, Elbaz, Fischer, Schreiber and Mudrik (2026) drew for four other theories: the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Perceptual Reality Monitoring (PRM) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), and a map of Predictive Processing (PP) that we drew ourselves from its proponents' publications, with the same method. Choose a map with Map, or put a second one next to it with Compare with.

About the format

The format is that of the prediction maps of Negro, Elbaz, Fischer, Schreiber and Mudrik (2026), who mapped the major theories of consciousness as claim networks and measured which claims carry the most weight in each. FMT's principles describe a computational substrate, not the brain, so the map uses the layout they give for substrate-general theories such as Integrated Information Theory: levels 1 and 2 hold mostly substrate-general claims, level 3 brain-specific claims and extrapolations to animals and machines, level 4 neuroscientific predictions and level 5 cognitive predictions. Their maps of GNWT, PRM and RPT use the layout for cognitive theories, in which level 3 holds cognitive predictions, level 4 the neural implementation and level 5 neuroscientific predictions.

How to read it

What the measures show

Compare the theories

One row per map. Select a name to open that map next to another.

MapClaimsArrowsLevelsLRC median / 90thHC median / 90thBC median / 90thPR median / 90thTop 3 by PageRank
6410160.016 / 0.1590.016 / 0.1190.0005 / 0.00700.014 / 0.022E3 0.030; F2 0.027; D7 0.025
445860.023 / 0.1630.023 / 0.1160.0011 / 0.00550.019 / 0.030F3 0.084; F4 0.054; F5 0.041
405360.026 / 0.2820.026 / 0.1750.0007 / 0.01180.023 / 0.037E10 0.049; E2 0.045; E8 0.038
375360.056 / 0.2220.042 / 0.1460.0024 / 0.00900.021 / 0.044F8 0.063; F3 0.052; F7 0.051
304060.034 / 0.2410.034 / 0.1900.0000 / 0.00860.029 / 0.046F4 0.069; F2 0.055; D1 0.047
456060.023 / 0.1820.023 / 0.1400.0005 / 0.00420.019 / 0.037D4 0.046; D8 0.044; C2 0.039

Quality of the maps

These numbers measure how well a map is articulated and how exposed it is to test, not whether the theory is true.

MapPredictionsReachFruitfulnessExposureRobustnessScopeExtrapolations (excluded)
share of theoretical claimsidle claimspredictions per theoretical claim, mean / medianper core claimmean / medianpredictions resting on the core≥2 parents≥2 disjoint paths from the coresubstrate-generalcognitive / brain / extrapolation
FMT2697% (33 of 34)C65.3 / 2.025.320% / 22%100%38%35%34%23% / 36% / 7%D8, D9, D10, D11
GNWT22100% (21 of 21)none5.1 / 4.022.023% / 21%100%45%36%0%52% / 45% / 2%D11
IIT1895% (20 of 21)B35.0 / 3.018.028% / 31%100%39%33%33%5% / 59% / 3%F3
PRM19100% (17 of 17)none5.0 / 3.019.026% / 24%100%47%42%0%65% / 32% / 3%D1
RPT1586% (12 of 14)C3, C44.0 / 3.015.027% / 21%100%27%13%3%60% / 33% / 3%D2
PP1785% (22 of 26)B6, B9, C3, E32.9 / 1.08.317% / 19%100%35%29%10%56% / 31% / 4%D9, D10
Which claims count as predictions
The level of a claim decides it, as in Negro et al. (preprint p. 7): levels 4 and 5 in the layout for substrate-general theories (FMT, IIT), levels 3 and 5 in the layout for cognitive theories (GNWT, PRM, RPT). Every other claim, the core included, is a theoretical claim. Arrows point from a claim to the claim that holds in virtue of it, so the claims above a prediction are the ones a failed prediction puts at risk. One rule overrides the levels in every map: a claim of the extrapolation class (alone or in a two-class box) counts as neither theoretical claim nor prediction and is listed in the last column as one of the extrapolations (excluded), because extrapolations to animals or machines are neither part of the theory's derivation base nor currently testable predictions in either layout. Without the rule the layouts would treat them unequally: FMT's extrapolations sit at level 3, which its layout counts as theory, while each other map's level-3 extrapolation would count as a prediction. Arrows still run through an excluded claim when the measures follow a chain. Scope still counts the extrapolation class.
Reach
The share of theoretical claims from which a chain of arrows reaches at least one prediction; the others are listed as idle claims. A claim with no route to a prediction cannot be tested through the map; these are the claims Negro et al. call "not particularly productive ... in terms of empirical consequences" (pp. 18–19).
Fruitfulness
The number of distinct predictions reachable from a theoretical claim, as mean / median over all theoretical claims, and averaged over the core claims (FMT has three, the other maps one). Kuhn counted fruitfulness, a theory's yield of new consequences, among the criteria for choosing between theories; Negro et al. read their maps for "which claims yield more downstream claims" (p. 27).
Exposure
For each prediction, the share of the map's theoretical claims among the claims it holds in virtue of, directly or through a chain, given as mean / median over the predictions; and the share of predictions that rest on a core claim. Popper made exposure to refutation the mark of an empirical theory. Lakatos described how auxiliary claims absorb a refutation and shield the core (preprint p. 3); exposure counts how much of the theory stands behind each test.
Robustness
The share of predictions with two or more parent claims, and the share reached from the core along two or more paths that share no arrow (counted as a maximum flow). Negro et al. note whether a claim is "supported by a single or multiple 'parent' claims" (p. 27). A prediction derived along two independent routes does not hang on a single auxiliary claim, so a failed test is harder to blame on that one claim alone.
Scope
The share of substrate-general claims, and of cognitive / brain-specific / extrapolation claims, among the claims outside the core, in the four classes of Negro et al. (p. 7). A claim drawn in two classes (their "hybrid claims", p. 24) counts half in each; the core is left out because the authors' files draw it grey, without a class. Kuhn's scope is the range of phenomena a theory speaks to; the substrate-general share says how much of a theory is stated without assuming a brain.
Experimental record in the ConTraSt database

ConTraSt (Yaron, Melloni, Pitts & Mudrik, 2022, Nature Human Behaviour 6, 593–604, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5) collects experiments whose authors interpreted their findings in light of a theory of consciousness, and records whether they read the findings as supporting or challenging it. ConTraSt groups the theories into four families. Counts of experiments per family, read from the database's public interface at https://contrastdb.tau.ac.il/, retrieved 2026-10-19 (the 2022 paper covered 412 experiments; the database has grown since):

ConTraSt familyMap on this pageSupportingChallenging
Global WorkspaceGNWT24457
Integrated InformationIIT12910
Higher OrderPRM (family only)1411
First Order & Predictive ProcessingRPT (family only)14524
noneFMTnot yet tested in ConTraSt

ConTraSt does not list PRM or RPT separately: PRM belongs to the higher-order family (Negro et al., preprint p. 5), RPT to the first-order family, so their rows count every theory in the family. An experiment interpreted in light of several theories counts once for each. The counts record how authors read their own results, most of them post hoc rather than as tests of critical predictions (Yaron et al., 2022), and they are not weighted by how central the tested prediction is to the theory. Data: ConTraSt, licensed CC BY-SA 4.0; the counts are quoted here, no data file is copied.

All claims

Method and credit

Method: Negro, N., Elbaz, E., Fischer, S., Schreiber, M., & Mudrik, L. (2026). Prediction maps as a gateway to better understand and test scientific theories. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/kqr87_v1 (licence CC BY 4.0).

The authors built an app for drawing and analysing prediction maps: https://xk29y8.csb.app. The file fmt-prediction-map.platform.json below loads in that app through its Load Map button. This FMT map was drawn by the theory's author following their method; Negro et al. did not build or review it, nor this page.

Maps of the other theories

The maps are provided as is, without warranties, as stated in the licence. Their use here does not imply that the authors endorse this page or the FMT map.

Downloads

The theory

Gruber, M. (2026). The Four-Model Theory of Consciousness. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18669891 (concept DOI, resolves to the latest version). An introduction in short articles: the FMT wiki at https://fmt.matthiasgruber.com/, with a page on this map at https://fmt.matthiasgruber.com/predictions/prediction-map/.